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Abstract: We analyze the dynamics of liquidity in Xetra, an electronic open limit order book. 
We use the Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM), a measure of the cost of a roundtrip trade of 
given size V. This measure captures the price and the quantity dimension of liquidity. We 
present descriptive statistics, analyze the cross-sectional determinants of the XLM measure 
and document its intraday pattern. Our main contribution is an analysis of the dynamics of the 
XLM measure around liquidity shocks. We use intraday event study methodology to analyze 
how a shock affects the XLM measure. We consider two sets of liquidity shocks, large trans-
actions (which are endogenous events because they originate in the market) and Bloomberg 
ticker news items (which are exogenous events because they originate outside of the market). 
We find that resiliency after large transactions is high, i.e., liquidity quickly reverts to “nor-
mal” levels. We further document that large trades take place at times when liquidity is un-
usually high. We interpret this as evidence that large transactions are timed. The Bloomberg 
ticker news items do not have a discernible effect on liquidity. 
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1  Introduction 
It is a commonplace that liquidity is the most important determinant of market quality. It af-
fects the transaction costs for investors, and it is a decisive factor in the competition for order 
flow among exchanges, and between exchanges and proprietary trading systems. Over the last 
decades researchers have gained a thorough understanding of liquidity. There is a wide array 
of liquidity measures, and the cross-sectional and time-series determinants of liquidity are 
fairly well understood. However, our understanding of the intraday dynamics of liquidity, and 
of the motives that govern traders' choices between market orders and limit orders is much 
less well understood.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on liquidity by analyzing the dynamics of liquidity in 
an electronic open limit order book. The main building block of our analysis is the Exchange 
Liquidity Measure XLM(V).
1 It measures the cost of a roundtrip trade of size V. We analyze 
how this measure reacts to liquidity shocks. To do so we employ an intraday event study a p-
proach. Using data at 1 -minute frequency we analyze how the XLM(V) measure reacts to 
liquidity shocks. We consider two types of shocks, large transactions and Bloomberg tick er 
news. The large transactions are endogenous events because they originate in the market. The 
ticker news, on the other hand, are exogenous.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. Large transactions (by definition) have an 
immediate negative impact on liquidity because limit orders in the book are executed. We find 
that liquidity partially recovers within one or two minutes after the transaction, but does not 
reach its pre-transaction level. There thus appears to be a permanent effect. The expla nation 
for this pattern is revealed once the XLM m easure prior to the transaction is included in the 
analysis. Liquidity increases prior to the transaction. Thus, transactions take place when l i-
                                                 
1  See section 2 and Gomber and Schweickert (2002) for a description of the XLM measure.   2 
quidity is unusually high. Immediately after the transaction, liquidity reverts to its normal 
level. It does not, however, revert to the unusually high level immediately prior to the transac-
tion. The observed pattern suggests that large transactions are timed. This is an important re-
sult because it implies that traders initiating large trades, although being arguably less patient 
than limit order traders, do have the patience to delay their transaction until liquidity is high 
enough. Our results are also consistent with theoretical predictions that market orders are 
more attractive when liquidity is high (e.g. Foucault 1999, Foucault et al. 2005), and with the 
intuition that the incentive to split large orders is lower when liquidity is high. The finding 
that large transactions are timed also suggests that the results of studies treating the timing of 
large trades as exogenous may be misleading.  
We do not find a clear pattern in the XLM measure around the publication of news items on 
the Bloomberg ticker. This may be because the news items are anticipated
2, because they do 
not have information content per se, or because Bloomberg is not the first channel through 
which the information reaches the market. Additional analyses yield support for the second 
and the third explanation.  
Our paper is related to various strands o f the microstructure literature. Several authors have 
proposed theoretical models of dynamic limit order markets (e.g. Parlour 1998, Foucault 
1999, Foucault et al. 2005, Goettler et al. 2005, Rosu 2009, Van Achter 2008). A common 
feature of these models is that they make predictions on the dynamics of liquidity by endoge-
nizing the choice between market orders and limit orders. Theissen and Wuyts (2009) empiri-
cally test predictions obtained from these models. The results are somewhat ambiguous, 
                                                 
2  Market participants may know that there will be an information event and withdraw liquidity in anticipation 
of the release. In such a case there will obviously be an effect on liquidity, but it will be observed prior to the 
event and not upon publication of the news item.    3 
which may be due to the fact that the models assume symmetric information, an assumption 
which is unlikely to hold in reality.  
The analysis of the impact of large trades on liquidity is related to several previous papers that 
analyze liquidity dynamics and the resiliency of a limit order book, where resiliency is de-
fined as the speed at which liquidity reverts to "normal" levels after an adverse liquidity 
shock.
3 Biais et al. (1995) and Hedvall and Niemeyer (1997) investigate into the dynamics of 
liquidity by cross-tabulating sequences of events in a limit order market.  Degryse et al. 
(2005), De Winne and d‟Hondt (2003) and Wuyts (2008) analyze the impact of large trades 
on depth and the quoted spread. Cummings and Frino (2008, 2010) perform a similar analysis 
for futures markets.  Large (2007) assesses resiliency using a continuous time impulse re-
sponse function framework while Kempf et al. (2007) use an autoregressive framework. Co-
pejans et al. (2001) used data from a Swedish index futures contract. They found that discre-
tionary traders trade in times of high liquidity, a finding consistent with ours and with the 
theoretical prediction in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). They further estimate structural VAR 
models to investigate the dynamics of a depth-based liquidity measure. Using data from the 
Swiss Stock Exchange Ranaldo (2004) documents that a trader's order type decision depends 
on the state of the limit order book, which is consistent with predictions from theoretical 
models of limit order markets (e.g. Foucault et al. 2005) and with our timing result. Chakra-
varty et al. (2009) analyze the joint dynamics of quoted prices and quoted depth using error 
correction models. Cao et al. (2009) analyze the extent to which limit orders beyond the best 
bid and ask convey information about future returns and future liquidity. Beltran-Lopez et al. 
(2009) identify commonalities in the order book by analyzing the structure of the order book 
using principal component analysis. Kempf and Mayston (2008) also analyze commonality in 
                                                 
3  This definition is in the spirit of Foucault et al. (2005). Alternatively, a market can be said to be resilient 
when prices quickly revert to "normal" levels after a shock (Black 1971, Harris 1990).    4 
the limit order book and find that commonality gets stronger the deeper one looks into the 
book.  
Our analysis of the impact of Bloomberg ticker news on liquidity is related to previous papers 
that looked into the effect of corporate events such as earnings and dividend announcements 
on liquidity (e.g. Venkatesh and Chiang 1986, Lee et al. 1993, Krinsky and Lee 1996, Graham 
et al. 2006). Ranaldo (2006) analyzes prices, volume, volatility, and liquidity around the re-
lease of firm-specific news items through Reuters alert. He documents that liquidity is above 
its normal level around the news release. Finally, Brooks et al. (2003) document the market 
response to unanticipated negative events (like plane crashes or the death of a CEO). They use 
a small sample, consisting of 21 events, and document that spreads are higher than normal for 
about 60 minutes after the event.  
Our paper contributes to this literature in several respects. First, it is the only paper analyzing 
the impact of endogenous and exogenous events in a unified framework. Second, by using the 
XLM(V) measure for different order sizes we provide a more complete analysis of the execu-
tion cost than is obtainable by only considering spread and depth data (as is done in many 
prior studies of resiliency). In a liquid market there is an almost constant flow of (predomi-
nantly small) limit orders. After a liquidity shock a new limit order can quickly restore a small 
spread. If the new limit order is small, however, the order book remains thin. Consequently, 
assessing the resiliency of the market by considering the quoted spread may lead to an over-
statement of the true liquidity in the market. The XLM measure, in contrast, is a summary 
measure of the total liquidity in the book and is thus better suited to address the issue of resi-
liency. A further advantage of the XLM measure is that it allows to assess the liquidity on the 
bid and the ask side of the market separately. The spread, in contrast, is by definition a sym-
metric measure.Third, our analysis of the resiliency of the market makes use of an intraday 
event study approach that allows us to formally test hypotheses relating to the dynamics of   5 
liquidity. Finally, our data comes directly from the exchange. We thus do not have to recon-
struct the order book. This is important because reconstructing the book with data that is 
available to researchers may yield results that are less than perfectly accurate.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first presents the XLM measure 
and then describes our data set. In section 3 we present a static analysis of the XLM measure. 
The main contribution of the paper is in section 4 which presents the design and results of our 
dynamic analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
2  Data set and XLM measure  
We use data from Xetra, the most liquid market for German stocks.
4 Xetra is an anonymous 
electronic limit order book. Trading starts at 9 a.m. with an opening call auction and (during 
our sample period) ends at 8 p.m. with a closing auction.
5 There are two intraday call auctions 
at 1 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. Liquidity is supplied by limit order traders. Besides normal limit o r-
ders, market participants may submit hidden orders ("iceberg orders"). These orders have a 
visible part which is displayed on the trading screens and an invisi ble part. When the visible 
part is executed it is replaced by a portion of the hidden part that is equal in size to the orig i-
nal visible part. This procedure is repeated until the hidden part is exhausted.  
                                                 
4  Besides electronic trading on Xetra there is floor trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and six regional 
exchanges. Xetra is the dominant market. Its market share is 91.3% (unweighted average for the sample 
stocks in August 2002, source: Deutsche Börse AG, Kassamarktstatistik August 2002). Due to the introduc-
tion of MiFID, market shares have changed since late 2007, however, as of 2011, Xetra is still the dominant 
market for German shares. A consolidated limit order book or a system similar to the Consolidated Quotation 
System and the Intermarket Trading System in the US does not exist. A detailed description of Xetra can be 
found in Kasch-Haroutounian and Theissen (2009).  
5  Since November 2003, the closing auction takes place at 5.30 p.m.    6 
The  Exchange  Liquidity  Measure,  XLM,  is  calculated  by  Deutsche  Börse  AG  since  July 
2002. It was introduced in order to consistently and continuously monitor the liquidity of the 
market.
6 The XLM measure uses the information about all the orders in the book (including 
the hidden part of iceberg orders
7) to calculate the weighted average price at which an order 
of given size could be executed immediately at time  t. Denote these prices by    , Bt PV  and 
  , St PV  where the index (B, S) indicates the type of the transaction (buyer-initiated or seller-
initiated) and V denotes the order size. Further, let MQt be the quote midpoint at time t. The 
execution cost for a buy and a sell order, measured in basis points, are given by  
   
























They are then added up to obtain the XLM measure as the cost of a roundtrip transaction:  
      ,, t B t S t XLM V XLM V XLM V  
Our data set contains information about 21 stocks (12 of which are included in the blue chip 
index DAX) and covers the 21 trading days from August 2 through August 31, 2002. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for the sample stocks. These cover a wide range in both market 
capitalization and trading volume. The market value of equity of the largest stock, Deutsche 
Telekom, is 48.7 billion € as compared to 194 million € for the smallest sample stock (Gerry 
                                                 
6  The XLM measure is provided via the Internet for the ten most liquid stocks and Exchange Traded Funds for 
the previous trading day.  
7  Comparing the XLM measure with and without inclusion of the hidden part of iceberg orders would be a 
convenient way to assess the importance of hidden liquidity. Our sample does not compris e the XLM meas-
ure without the hidden part of iceberg orders. However, as the focus of our analysis is on the dynamics of l i-
quidity (or, put differently, the resiliency of the market), using a measure that includes the hidden liquidity is 
appropriate. For an in-depth analysis of hidden orders see Bessembinder et al. (2009).    7 
Weber Int.). Similarly, trading volume in the month of August 2002 ranges from 6.3 billion € 
for the most active stock (Allianz) to 1.7 million € for the least active stock (again Gerry We-
ber Int.).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Our data set contains the XLM measure (separately for the buy and the sell side) for each 
minute of the trading day and for different order sizes V. The order size grid is not the same 
for all stocks. Rather, it is differentiated with respect to liquidity. For the most liquid stocks 
(the constituent stocks of the DAX and the EuroStoxx 50), order sizes range from € 25,000 to 
€ 5,000,000. For all other stocks order sizes range from € 10,000 to € 1,000,000. However, for 
less liquid stocks the book is not deep enough to accommodate trades of up to € 1,000,000. 
Therefore, XLM(V) measures for large values of V are not observed for some stocks. The 
effective order size grids for the sample stocks (i.e., those values of V for which there are data 
in our sample) are also reported in Table 1.  
3  Static analysis 
This section provides a detailed analysis of liquidity using the XLM(V) measure. Table 2 
presents results for individual stocks. The table shows the half spread and single-sided XLM 
measures for trading volumes of € 25,000, 100,000, 500,000 and 1,000,000. In the sequel, 
when  referring  to  a  specific  XLM(V)  measure,  we  will  measure  the  volume  in  1,000  €. 
XLM(1000) thus corresponds to a volume of € 1,000,000.  
The upper entry in each cell of Table 2 reports the average one-sided XLM measure in basis 
points. Measures for the cost of a round trip trade can be obtained by simply adding the XLM 
for a purchase and a sale. The lower figure reports the availability, defined as the percentage   8 
of cases in which the order book was deep enough to allow immediate execution of an order 
of the size given in the first row.
8  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Panel A shows the results for the DAX stocks, Panel B those for the non-DAX stocks. In both 
panels, stocks are sorted by market capitalization. For the DAX stocks the availability is a l-
ways 100%, indicating that the order book for these stocks is always deep enough to allow 
immediate execution of trades with  a volume of up to € 1,000,000. For four of the DAX 
stocks availability is 100% up to a volume of 5,000,000 € (the maximum V in our sample). As 
one would expect, depth is lower for the non-DAX stocks. Availability decreases with de-
creasing market capitalization. For the smallest sample stock (in terms of market capitaliza-
tion), Gerry Weber Int., trades with a volume of € 25,000 can almost always be executed, but 
€ 100,000 trades can only be executed 21.9% of the time.
9  
The large differences with respect to market capitalization and trading volume documented in 
Table 1 suggest large differences in execution costs. This conjecture is confirmed by the data. 
The quoted half-spread ranges from 6.1 basis points for DaimlerChrysler to 83.8 basis points 
for Zapf Creation. Overall, liquidity appears to be reasonably high. For the 8 most liquid sam-
ple stocks, the roundtrip cost for a trade with a volume of € 1 million is less than 1%.  
                                                 
8  Our data set contains values for XLM(V) only if the book is deep enough to allow for a trade of size V on 
both sides of the market. Therefore, the availability measures for buyer- and seller-initiated trades are equal.  
9  In two cases (CON, XLM(1000) for seller-initiated trades and ZPF, XLM(100) also for seller-initiated trades) 
the XLM measure decreases with trade size. This is explained by a sharp decrease in availability. Take ZPF 
as an example. Seller-initiated trades of € 25,000 can always be accommodated, and the one-sided transaction 
cost is 213 basis points. Trades of € 100,000 can only be executed 34.7% of the time. Conditional of the or-
der book being sufficiently thick to accommodate the larger trade, the transaction cost is only 209 basis 
points. In principle, this might introduce a selection bias into our analysis. However, most of our analysis fo-
cuses on order sizes for which availability is 100%. In these cases, the problem does not arise.    9 
There are differences in the slope of the order book. Define, for the DAX stocks, the slope as 
the ratio of the XLM(1000) and the quoted spread. This ratio is 4.97 for the DAX stock with 
the highest market capitalization and 12.05 for the stock with the lowest market capitalization. 
The correlation between the slope measure and the log of market capitalization is -0.86. The 
picture for the non-DAX stocks is similar. Using the XLM(100) rather than the XLM(1000) to 
calculate the slope measure, we obtain a correlation of -0.78. These results indicate that stocks 
with higher spreads also have lower depth.  
Execution costs for buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades are not different from each other. 
In 33 cases (out of a total of 73 shown in the table), the XLM measure for a purchase is lower, 
in 40 cases it is higher. A cross-sectional test for the equality of either the mean or the median 
yields no significant result. This finding is surprising in the light of the existing literature. 
Irvine et al. (2000) report that depth on the ask side of the limit order book of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange is higher than the depth on the bid side. Similarly, Chordia et al. (2002) find 
that, on average, there are more market buy orders than market sell orders on the NYSE. As 
this imbalance has to be absorbed by the limit order book, their results also suggest higher 
depth on the ask side of the book.  
Table 3 takes a closer look at the determinants of the execution cost measures (the quoted 
spread, XLM(25), XLM(50) and XLM(100)) in the cross-section. We use the log of market 
capitalization, the turnover ratio (defined as the ratio of trading volume and market capitaliza-
tion), the inverse of the price (in order to account for the fixed minimum tick size) and the 
standard deviation of returns as independent variables. Univariate analysis reveals that all four 
measures of execution costs are significantly negatively related to market capitalization and 
turnover, and positively related to the inverse of the price. The correlation with the standard 
deviation of returns has the expected positive sign in all four cases but is never significant, 
possibly due to the low number of observations (21 in the cross-section). In a multivariate   10 
analysis the four independent variables explain a large part of the cross-sectional differences 
of the liquidity measures, as is evidenced by R
2‟s ranging from 0.59 to 0.86.
10  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Figure 1 shows the intraday pattern of the quoted spread, the XLM(100) and the XLM(1000) 
measure for the DAX stocks. In a first step, we average over the 22 daily observations we 
have for each stock. In the second step, we average over the 12 DAX stocks in our sample. 
Each point in the figure thus represents an average over 22*12 observations.  
The intraday patterns for the three liquidity measures are very similar. This is also evidenced 
by very high correlations (between 0.954 and 0.991).
11 Overall, there is a very pronounced u-
shaped pattern. Liquidity increases during the first hours of the trading day. It then stays more 
or less constant but decreases sharply after the intraday call auction at 5.30  p.m. The reason 
for this sharp decrease is that many institutional investors close their books at 5.30 p.m.  
Two further points deserve mentioning. First, there appear to be temporary drops in liquidity 
at 2.30 p.m. and before 4 p.m. This is likely to be  due to the start of trading in the US (index 
futures trading in Chicago starts at 2.20 p.m. and the NYSE opens at 3.30 p.m. Central Eur o-
pean Time).
12 Second, liquidity for large trades (i.e., the XLM(1000) measure) is very high 
immediately after the two intraday auctions at 1 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. This effect is caused by 
large limit orders that were submitted to the auction but have not been executed because the 
limit was slightly above or below the resulting market clearing price. The increase in liquidity 
                                                 
10  We do not report the coefficient estimates of the multivariate regressions because of the presence of severe 
multicollinearity.  
11  Despite the high correlation between the quoted spread and the XLM measure, it has been documented in 
previous research that the liquidity beyond the best quotes has additional information content (e.g. Beltran -
Lopez et al. 2009, Cao et al. 2009).  
12  For an analysis of the impact of the market opening in the US on trading in Europe, see Harju and Hussain 
(2011).    11 
is short-lived, however, because these orders are either executed or cancelled. We do not ob-
serve a similar pattern for the quoted spread or the XLM(100) measure.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Figure 2 shows the intraday pattern for the non-DAX stocks. Given the lower overall liquidity 
of these stocks, we choose to depict the quoted spread, the XLM(25) and the XLM(50) meas-
ures. Again, there is a pronounced u-shaped pattern and a high degree of similarity between 
the three liquidity measures (correlations are between 0.972 and 0.988). Apparently the non-
DAX stocks are hardly affected by the opening of the US markets, probably because they tend 
to have a domestic shareholder basis and are not targeted by international investors to the 
same extent as the DAX stocks. We neither observe a spike at 2:30 p.m., nor do we observe a 
decrease in liquidity prior to 4 p.m.  
Insert Figure 2 about here 
4  Dynamic analysis 
In this section we investigate into the dynamics of liquidity. To this end, we analyze both the 
immediate effect and the adjustment path after a shock adversely affecting liquidity. This re-
quires  the  identification  of  liquidity  shocks.  We  propose  two  complementary  approaches. 
First, we analyze the impact of large trades on liquidity. These trades are events that are en-
dogenous, i.e., they originate in the very market we are analyzing. Second, we analyze the 
impact that company news reported by Bloomberg have on liquidity. Although such news 
items may occasionally be anticipated by the market, they do not originate in the market. We 
therefore consider these events to be exogenous.    12 
4.1  Endogenous events: large trades 
A large trade consumes liquidity and therefore adversely affects liquidity as measured by the 
XLM measure. The size of the shock is directly related to the trade size. It is therefore impor-
tant how we define a “large” transaction. We decided to select the 100 largest trades in each 
stock with the additional provision that the order triggering the trade must have a volume of at 
least € 20,000.
13 The latter requirement is a binding restriction only for the three least liquid 
stocks in the sample. For these stocks, the sample consists of less than 100 observations. The 
total number of observations is 1,894 (1,200 for the 12 DAX stocks and 694 for the 9 non-
DAX stocks).  
These large transactions are not evenly distributed over the trading day. Figure 3 shows a ker-
nel density plot of the transaction times. The distribution is double-peaked. The first peak is 
observed in the morning, at about 10 a.m., the second in the afternoon at about 4:30 p.m.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
The number of observations that we include in our analysis is reduced by additional require-
ments. We require a complete series of XLM(V) observations during an event window which 
extends from 15 minutes prior to the large trade until 16 minutes after the trade. We therefore 
exclude transactions that occur in the first 15 minutes and the last 16 minutes of the conti-
nuous trading session. We further exclude transactions that occur within 15 minutes before 
and 16 minutes after the two intraday call auctions.  
                                                 
13  These criteria are, admittedly, somewhat arbitrary. At first sight, an alternative is to select the x% largest 
trades for each stock. However, given the extreme differences in the number of trades for the sample stocks 
(see the figures on trading volume in Table 1), this would result in very different numbers of observations 
and, as a consequence, the results would be dominated by the largest sample stocks. We therefore decided to 
use equal numbers of observations.    13 
The final sample consists of 955 large trades for the DAX stocks (483 buyer-initiated trades 
with an average order size of € 899,402 and 472 seller-initiated trades with an average order 
size of € 866,337) and 547 large trades for the non-DAX stocks (258 buyer-initiated trades 
with an average order size of € 133,949 and 289 seller-initiated trades with an average order 
size of € 127,920).  
In order to analyze the impact of the large trades on liquidity and the resiliency of the market 
we employ an event study approach. We define t0 to be the observation immediately prior to 
the large trade. The impact of the large trade (or, put differently, the size of the liquidity 
shock) is measured by the change in liquidity from t0 to t1. Note that we are likely to under-
state the size of the liquidity shock. This is because our observation frequency is one minute. 
If a large trade occurs at 9:50:30 and our next observation for the liquidity measure is at 
9:51:00, we understate the impact of the transaction when new limit orders have been submit-
ted during the 30 second delay. Given that there is a constant flow of small limit orders (at 
least for active stocks), such an understatement is quite likely. Note, however, that these limit 
orders are unlikely to be submitted in direct response to the liquidity shock because traders 
will need some time to observe the large trade, decide whether to submit an order and to enter 
the order into the system
14.  
For the DAX stocks we report results for the quoted spread, XLM(100) and XLM(1000). For 
the less liquid non -DAX stocks we report results for the quoted s pread, XLM(25) and 
XLM(100). For both groups of stocks we report aggregated results for all large transactions 
and separate results for buyer -initiated and seller-initiated transactions. For buyer-initiated 
and seller-initiated transactions we report the impact on liquidity separately for both sides of 
                                                 
14 This obviously has changed due to the increased usage of Algorithmic Trading. However, Algorithmic Trad-
ing on Xetra was not existent in 2002 yet and started to become relevant from 2003 (source: Deutsche Börse 
AG, Preliminary Results Q4 und FY 2007).    14 
the book, e.g., we report XLMB(100) and XLMS(100) separately instead of only reporting 
XLM(100). This allows us to analyze whether large market buy orders affect liquidity only on 
the ask side or also on the bid side (and vice versa for large market sell orders). The price 
pressure exerted by a large market buy order decreases the probability that a limit buy order in 
the book will execute. This is particularly true for limit orders away from the best quote. If 
such orders are replaced with more aggressively priced limit orders, liquidity on the bid side 
may improve. If they are replaced with market orders, on the other hand, liquidity on the bid 
side may decrease.
15  
The results are presented in Table 4. Panel A shows the results for the DAX stocks, Panel B 
those for the non-DAX stocks. The size of the liquidity shocks and the corresponding t -
statistics are depicted in the column labeled “0;1”. The unit of measurement is basis points. 
All values are positive and statistically different from zero. This is no surprise because, by 
definition, large trades will negatively affect liquidity.  
The increase in the liquidity measure is positively related to the transaction volume V the li-
quidity measure corresponds to. Take, as an example, the DAX stocks in Panel A. The quoted 
spread increases by 3.45 basis points, the XLM(100) by 5.71 basis points and the XLM(1000) 
by 21.82 basis points. A similar picture emerges when considering only buyer-initiated or 
only seller-initiated trades in DAX stocks.  
There are two (not mutually exclusive) explanations for this pattern. First, as already noted, 
there may be a flow of (predominantly small) limit orders that reduce the spread but, because 
of their small volume, have little impact on the XLM measure for large V. The second expla-
nation lies in the shape of the order book. If the slope of the book (i.e., the bid volume and ask 
                                                 
15  Some limit order traders may need to execute their trade within a specified period. When (due to price pres-
sure) the probability that their limit orders execute decreases, they may choose to use market orders instead 
(Handa and Schwartz 1996, see also Ahn et al. 2001).    15 
volume at each tick) was constant, the size of the shock should be identical for all three meas-
ures. The slope of the book is, however, not constant. Rather, the quantity bid or offered is 
lower for prices which are further away from the midpoint.
16 Therefore, the size of the liquidi-
ty shock as measured by the change in XLM(V) is increasing in V.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
In a resilient market, liquidity quickly reverts to its pre-shock levels. We therefore expect to 
see negative changes in the liquidity measures in the minutes after the large transaction. Table 
4 reports the changes from minute 1 to 2, from 2 to 3, from 3 to 4, and from 4 to 5. With only 
two exceptions, all values until minute 3 are negative, confirming the expectation that liquidi-
ty increases in the minutes after the shock.  
Resiliency appears to be higher for smaller values of V. Define the reversion rate as the frac-
tion of the initial shock that is undone until minute t. Considering the DAX stocks first, we 
find that for the quoted spread and the XLM(100), the reversion rate until minute 3 is about 
50%. For the XLM(1000) this reversion rate is only about 15%. The picture for the non-DAX 
stocks is similar. The reversion rate is about 50% for the quoted spread and the XLM(25), but 
only about 33% for the XLM(100). This implies that it takes longer to restore large depth than 
to restore a small spread. It also implies that considering the XLM measure for different trade 
sizes rather than only the quoted spread adds information.  
The results so far suggest that liquidity recovers after a shock. But does it really revert to its 
pre-shock level? The results in the columns labeled 0;3 and 0;16 suggest that it does not. Fig-
ures in these columns measure the cumulative change in liquidity from its pre-shock level 
                                                 
16  The XLMs(1000) for the DAX stocks (i.e., the cost for a sell order of volume € 1,000,000) is, on average, 
39.6 basis points. The additional cost incurred when increasing the transaction size by € one million are 42.0 
basis point for the second million, 51.2 for the third, 63.3 for the fourth and 63.9 basis points for the fifth mil-
lion. Results for buy orders are very similar.    16 
until minute 3 and 16, respectively. In almost all cases there is a significant positive change. 
When considering buy and sell orders separately, we observe that the cumulative change in 
liquidity is more pronounced on the side of the book where the trade occurred. Taken at face 
value, these results would imply that a large trade triggers a permanent liquidity decrease.  
However, this interpretation neglects the fact that the timing of a large transaction is not ran-
dom. Traders may submit their orders in times of unusually high liquidity. In this case, we 
should not expect liquidity to revert to its pre-shock level. It should instead revert to its “nor-
mal” level. We choose liquidity at time -15 (i.e., 15 minutes prior to the large trade) as a rep-
resentative for the “normal” level of liquidity. The first column in Table 4, labeled -15;0, 
measures the change in liquidity from time -15 until immediately prior to the large trade. For 
the DAX stocks this change is significantly negative for all values of V. Considering buyer-
initiated trades and seller initiated trades separately, we find that liquidity increases predomi-
nantly on the side of the market where the trade is to be made. For the non-DAX stocks we 
also find that liquidity changes are negative for all values of V. However, the change is signif-
icantly different from zero only for the largest order size, V = 100. The result that liquidity 
increases predominantly on the side of the book where the trade is to be made holds for buyer-
initiated trades but not for seller-initiated trades.  
These results allow the conclusion that large transactions are timed. They take place when 
liquidity is unusually high.
17 What is relevant here is, of course, the liquidity for large trades. 
Therefore, the fact that, for the  non-DAX stocks, we only have a significant result for the 
largest order size category does not contradict our conclusion.  
The last column in Table 4 measures the change in liquidity from 15 minutes prior to the large 
trade until 16 minutes after the event. For the DAX stocks this change is insignificant for all 
                                                 
17  Degryse et al. (2005) report a similar finding. Their analysis is based on the quoted spread rather than on a 
XLM(V)-type measure.    17 
values of V. This indicates that liquidity, although not reverting to its pre-shock level, does 
revert to its normal level. For the non-DAX stocks we obtain a similar result for the large or-
der size category, V=100. For the smaller order size categories, particularly for the quoted 
spread, there appears to be some evidence of a permanent decrease in liquidity. A possible 
explanation for this result is that the increase in liquidity prior to a large trade extends over 
more than 15 minutes. In this case, the XLM measure 15 minutes prior to the large trade may 
not correspond to a “normal” level of liquidity but rather already corresponds to an above-
normal degree of liquidity.  
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the results for V = 100 for the DAX stocks. 
There is a pronounced increase in liquidity prior to the large trade that lasts about three mi-
nutes. The large trade (occurring between t0 and t1) has an immediate adverse effect on liquid-
ity. After the shock liquidity recovers and reaches its normal level after about 4 minutes.  
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Figure 5 presents a similar graph for the non-DAX stocks. Here, the increase in liquidity prior 
to the event extends over the full 15-minute interval. Also, it takes longer for liquidity to re-
vert to its “normal” level after the event. The differences between the DAX stocks and the 
non-DAX stocks are likely to be due to the fact that V = 100 represents a rather “normal” or-
der size for DAX stocks but a very large size for the non-DAX stocks.
18  
Insert Figure 5 about here 
We interpreted our results as representing evidence of the timing of large trades. However, in 
section 3 we have documented pronounced intraday patterns. If large trades cluster in times 
when liquidity is increasing, the results that we have presented may be caused by the gener al 
intraday pattern rather than by the timing of large trades. To address this concern, we repeat 
our analysis with time-of-day adjusted liquidity measures. To obtain these, we calculate, sepa-
                                                 
18  In fact, the picture for V = 1,000 for the DAX stocks (not shown) is very similar to Figure 5.    18 
rately for each stock, an average liquidity measure for each minute of the trading day. The 
average is taken over the 22 trading days in the sample. We next subtract this average from 
each observation. The result is the deviation of the liquidity measure from its average at the 
particular minute of the trading day. This normalized measure is independent of the general 
intraday pattern. We repeat our event study with these normalized liquidity measures. The 
results are shown in Table 5.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
They are fully consistent with those presented before. Liquidity is negatively affected by the 
shock and, in the minutes immediately following the large trade, reverts. It does not, however, 
revert to the level immediately prior to the shock as is evidenced by the significant positive 
cumulative change from time 0 to times 3 and 16, respectively. We again find significant in-
creases in liquidity in the 15 minutes preceding the large trade for the DAX stocks. As before, 
we observe such an increase in liquidity for the non-DAX stocks only for the XLM(100) 
measure. These results support the conclusion that large trades are timed.  
4.2  Exogenous events: ticker news 
If new information is released that is considered relevant for the valuation of a stock, the order 
book may be affected in several ways. First, limit orders standing in the book may be picked 
off by those who quickly respond to the new information. Second, limit orders may be can-
celled in order to prevent being picked off. Third, traders may submit new limit orders. Al-
though the total effect on liquidity is not clear a priori, it is more likely that the immediate 
effect on liquidity will be negative.  
In order to test this prediction we analyze company-specific news items on the Bloomberg 
ticker. We proceed as follows. First, we select the news items according to the following 
rules:    19 
  the company name appears in the headline,  
  the news item is in either German or English,  
  it is neither an obvious repetition of an earlier item, nor is it marked as an update of an 
earlier item,  
  the news is not related to stock price movements
19 and  
  the news is published during the trading hours and not within 15 minutes of an (open-
ing, intradaily or closing) call auction.  
The number of news items differs across firms. The highest number is observed for Allianz 
(60), the lowest for Gerry Weber Int. (1).
20 For each item we obtain the publishing time. We 
then proceed by applying the event study methodology described in the previous section. The 
results are presented in Table 6 and in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
21  
Insert Table 6 about here 
Apparently, the news items do not cause a shock to the liquidity of the market. The immediate 
effect (shown in the column labeled 0;1) is never significant and is even negative in four cas-
es. Given that there is no shock in the first place, it is not surprising that we do not observe an 
increase in liquidity after the event. There is no significant change in liquidity between minute 
                                                 
19  There  are  frequent  news  items  like  “German  stocks  rise,  led  by  Bayer,  BASF  ...”.  These  items  do  not 
represent new information to traders monitoring the market and are therefore excluded.  
20  Some of the news items (e.g., earnings announcements) are scheduled. Market participants thus know that an 
announcement will be made, but do not know the exact contents of the announcement. The number of sch e-
duled announcements in our sample is not sufficiently large to allow for a separate analysis.  
21  We only present the results without time-of-day adjustment. The results with adjustment are very similar.    20 
1 and minute 5, and the cumulated effects from minute 0 to minutes 3 and 16, respectively, 
are also insignificant.
22  
Insert Figure 6 and Figure 7 about here 
The result that the ticker news items do not have a significant impact on liquidity is surpri s-
ing. In order to assess the information content of the news items, we analyze their price i m-
pact. We obtain time-stamped data on all Xetra transactions in our sample stocks.  We then 
calculate the return over varying intervals extending from 15 minutes prior to the event until 
15 minutes after the event.  The analysis is complicated by the fact that w e do not know 
whether any given news item represents positive or negative news . However, new informa-
tion, be it positive or negative, will cause prices to change. We therefore analyze absolute log 
returns to test whether the Bloomberg news items are informative. A significant result indi-
cates that the news item causes prices to change and thus contains information about the stock 
value. The results are shown in Table 7.  
It appears that the information content of the news items is rather limited. The average abso-
lute return from the last trade prior to the event until the first trade after the event is 0.09%. 
Allowing 5 [15] more minutes for prices to adjust results in an average absolute return of 
0.24% [0.43%]. To put this into perspective, we also calculate absolute average returns over 5 
and 15 minute periods prior to the event. They amount to 0.27% and 0.44%, respectively, and 
are thus larger than the post-event returns.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
These results are consistent with the Bloomberg ticker news items not having informational 
content. They are, however, also consistent with information reaching the market prior to the 
news release on Bloomberg. In this case, both the absolute returns prior to and those after the 
                                                 
22  There is, however, weak evidence for a decrease in liquidity prior to the event. The cumulative change in 
liquidity from t-15 to t0 is always positive and is significant at the 10% level in one case.    21 
event may be above their normal levels. To shed some light on this issue we test whether the 
absolute returns over the event window are significantly larger than average absolute returns 
in non-event periods. We obtain critical values from a simple bootstrap analysis. We random-
ly select (with replacement) a sample of exogenous events that is equal in size to our actual 
sample. We retain the stock id and the exact time of day of the randomly chosen sample. 
However, we replace the event day by randomly choosing one of the 22 sample days. This 
procedure provides us with a random sample of "event" times such that the distribution of 
stocks and the distribution of event times are identical to those in the actual sample. We then 
calculate the average absolute price changes for the random sample. This procedure is re-
peated 1,000 times. The critical values are the 95% quantiles of the resulting distribution of 
average absolute returns.  
Using these critical values we find that the immediate price impact (i.e., the return from the 
last price prior to the news release to the first transaction after the release) is not significantly 
different from its normal level. Absolute returns measured over 5 and 15 minute intervals 
prior to the publication of the Bloomberg ticker news items, however, are statistically signifi-
cant. The post-event 15 minute average absolute returns are also significant whereas the post-
event 5 minute returns are not.  
Two conclusions follow from these results. First, the finding that pre-event average absolute 
returns are above their normal levels indicates that Bloomberg is not (or at least not always) 
the first channel through which the information reaches the market. Second, the low value of 
the average absolute returns implies that they are, in spite of their statistical significance, eco-
nomically insignificant. This, in turn, indicates that the information content of the average 
Bloomberg ticker news item is small.  
What do these conclusions imply for our analysis of liquidity? The finding that Bloomberg is 
not the first channel through which the information reaches the market indicates that the pub-  22 
lication time is not the accurate event time. The result that the information content of the news 
items appears to be generally low implies that the "true" abnormal returns (i.e., those that 
would obtain if the exact event time was known) are also low. In the light of this it is not sur-
prising that we did not find pronounced liquidity patterns around the publication of the news 
items.  
5  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we present a static and dynamic analysis of the liquidity in the Xetra order book 
based on the Exchange Liquidity Measure, XLM(V). The calculation of the XLM is based on 
all orders in the limit order book. It relates the price at which a buy order, a sell order or a 
round trip trade of size V could be executed to the midpoint of the spread.  
We obtain intraday data with a frequency of one minute for 21 stocks. As one would expect, 
we find pronounced cross-sectional differences. The XLM measure decreases (and liquidity 
thus increases) with market capitalization, trading volume and the price level. We further 
document a pronounced u-shaped intraday pattern. We do not find differences in the liquidity 
on the bid side and the ask side of the book. This is in contrast to the extant literature (e.g. 
Irvine et al. 2000, Chordia et al. 2002) that suggests a deeper book on the ask side.  
In our dynamic analysis we investigate how liquidity reacts to shocks, and whether and how it 
reverts to “normal” levels after the shock. To this end we analyze two distinct sets of events: 
large trades (endogenous events) and Bloomberg ticker news items (exogenous events).  
We find that large trades are timed. They occur when liquidity in the market is unusually 
high. This is evidenced by the fact that liquidity increases significantly prior to the transac-
tion. The large trade triggers an immediate decrease in liquidity. Within 2 to 3 minutes (de-
pending on the characteristics of the stock) liquidity reverts to its normal level. It does not, 
however, revert to the unusually high level immediately prior to the large trade.    23 
The observation that large trades are timed may not appear very surprising at first sight. It 
does, however, have an important implication. It implies that traders initiating large trades, 
although being arguably less patient than limit order traders, do have the patience to delay 
their transaction until liquidity is high enough. Our evidence that large trades are timed also 
suggests that studies treating the timing of large transactions as exogenous may be mislead-
ing.  
The Bloomberg ticker news items do not affect liquidity in a systematic way. Liquidity does 
not decrease immediately after the publication, nor does it increase in the minutes following 
publication. In order to shed more light on this surprising result we analyze the price impact 
of the news releases. The results suggest that the news items indeed have low information 
content and that Bloomberg is not always the first channel through which the information 
reaches the market. It is thus not surprising that the Bloomberg ticker news items do not have 
a discernible impact on liquidity.    24 
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Table 1: Sample Stocks 
 
name  ticker symbol  market capitaliza-
tion (€ million, July 
31, 2002) 
trading volume 




Deutsche Telekom  DTE  48,747  4,795.6  25 - 5,000 
Siemens  SIE  44,961  5,616.5  25 - 5,000 
DaimlerChrysler  DCX  44,417  4,740.4  25 - 5,000 
Deutsche Bank  DBK  36,126  5,695.1  25 - 5,000 
Allianz  ALV  35,306  6,327.4  25 - 5,000 
E.ON  EOA  34,565  3,229.9  25 - 5,000 
Münchener Rück-
versicherung 
MUV2  34,541  4,046.9  25 - 5,000 
BASF  BAS  22,753  2,681.8  25 - 5,000 
RWE  RWE  18,832  1,438.3  25 - 5,000 
Bayer  BAY  18,405  1,969.2  25 - 5,000 
Volkswagen  VOW  16,569  1,792.7  25 - 5,000 
Bayerische Hypo- 
und Vereinsbank 
HVM  10,913  1,008.9  25 - 5,000 
Altana  ALT  7,065  313.0  10 - 1,000 
Merck  MRK  3,371  43.3  10 - 750 
Karstadt  KAR  2,756  122.7  10 - 1,000 
Continental  CON  2,285  95.2  10 - 1,000 
Fraport  FRA  1,940  31.0  10 - 250 
Hugo Boss Vz.  BOS3  728  32.0  10 - 250 
Gildemeister  GIL  235  3.3  10 - 150 
Zapf Creation  ZPF  200  3.6  10 - 150 
Gerry Weber Int.   GWI  194  1.7  10 - 100 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the stocks in the sample. The last column indicates the smallest and the 
largest order sizes for which our data set contains the XLM measure. Intermediate order sizes are  
  for  stocks  with  range  25,000  -  5,000,000:  50,000,  100,000,  250,000,  500,000,  1,000,000,  2,000,000, 
3,000,000 and 4,000,000  
  for all other stocks: 25,000, 50,000, 75,000, 100,000, 150,000, 250,000, 500,000, 750,000 and 1,000,000 (up 
to the stock specific maximum size given in the table).    28 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the XLM Measure  
 
Panel A: DAX stocks 
Stock  LP (half 
spread) 
€ 25,000  € 100,000  € 500,000  € 1,000,000 
buy  sell  buy  sell  buy  sell  buy  sell 










































































































































































































Panel B: Non-DAX stocks 
Stock  LP (half 
spread) 
€ 25,000  € 100,000  € 500,000  € 1,000,000 
buy  sell  buy  sell  buy  sell  buy  sell 




























99.8  na  na 









































100  na  na  na  na 







99.1  na  na  na  na 







96.8  na  na  na  na 







34.7  na  na  na  na 







21.9  na  na  na  na 
 
The table shows descriptive statistics for the XLM measure. The first column identifies the stock. The second 
column reports the liquidity premium (= the average quoted half-spread). The remaining columns report the 
XLM measure, separately for buyer- and seller-initiated transactions, for the order size reported in the first row. 
There are two entries in each cell. The upper figure reports the average XLM measure in basis points. The lower 
figure reports the availability, defined as the percentage of cases in which the order book was deep enough to 
allow immediate execution of an order of the size given in the first line. “na” indicates that our data set does not 
contain the XLM measure for the respective order size (see the description of the order size grids in Table 1).    29 
Table 3: Determinants of the XLM Measure  
 
  log(cap)  turnover 
ratio 





Quoted spread  -0.935*  -0.755*  0.680*  0.111  0.86 
XLM(25)  -0.834*  -0.625*  0.549*  0.131  0.67 
XLM(50)  -0.788*  -0.572*  0.503*  0.134  0.59 
XLM(100)  -0.857*  -0.639*  0.780*  0.078  0.79 
 
The table shows bivariate correlations between the variables in the first column an d the first row. The log of 
market capitalization and turnover are calculated from the data provided in Table 1. The inverse of the price and 
the standard deviation of returns are calculated from daily closing price s for the period December 31, 2001 
through July 31, 2002. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level. The last column shows the R
2 of a 
cross-sectional regression of the liquidity measure indicated in the first column on the independent variables 
listed in the first row.    30 
Table 4: Event study results - large transactions 
Panel A: DAX stocks 
all trades 
   -15;0  0;1  1;2  2;3  3;4  4;5  0;3  0;16  -15;16 
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Table 4 (contd.) 
Panel B: Non-DAX stocks 
all trades 
   -15;0  0;1  1;2  2;3  3;4  4;5  0;3  0;16  -15;16 
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The table shows the results of an intraday event study.  For each stock we identify the 100 largest transactions 
during the sample period. As a secon d criterion, we only include transactions triggered by orders of a size e x-
ceeding € 20,000. The second criterion is only a binding restriction for three of the non-DAX stocks. The upper 
entry in each cell shows the (cumulated) change in the liquidity measure denoted in the first row over the period 
given in the first line. Time is measured in minutes, time 0 is the observation immediately prior to the large 
transaction. The lower entry in each cell shows the t-statistic. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Panel A presents results for the DAX stocks, Panel B those for the non-DAX stocks.    32 
Table 5: Event study results - large transactions, time-of-day adjustment 
Panel A: DAX stocks 
all trades 
   -15;0  0;1  1;2  2;3  3;4  4;5  0;3  0;16  -15;16 
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Table 5 (contd.) 
Panel B: Non-DAX stocks 
all trades 
   -15;0  0;1  1;2  2;3  3;4  4;5  0;3  0;16  -15;16 
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This table is similar to  Table 4. The only difference is that the upper entry in each cell shows the (cumulated) 
change in the time-of-day adjusted liquidity measures. The adjusted measure is the difference between the l i-
quidity measure for a given minute and the average  liquidity measure for that minute. Please see the legend of 
Table 4 for further details.    34 
Table 6: Event study results - ticker news 
Panel A: DAX stocks 


























































Panel B: Non-DAX stocks 


























































The table shows the results of an intraday event study. For each stock we identified (according to the rules out-
lined in the main text) company-specific news items published on the Bloomberg ticker. The upper entry in each 
cell shows the (cumulated) change in the liquidity measure denoted in the first row over the period given in the 
first line. Time is measured in minutes, time 0 is the observation immediately prior to the publishing time. The 
lower entry in each cell shows the t-statistic. Panel A presents results for the DAX stocks, Panel B those for the 
non-DAX stocks.    35 
Table 7: Price impact of ticker news  
 











absolute return  0.4380  0.2688  0.0917  0.2433  0.4274 
5% critical value  0.4295  0.2548  0.1116  0.2786  0.4215 
 
The table shows the price effect of the Bloomberg ticker news. The sample comprises 407 events. The first line 
shows the average absolute log return (measured in percent) for the period indicated in the headline. "Pre-event" 
and "post-event" refer to the last transaction prior to and the first transaction after the news event, respectively. 
"-15", "-5", "+5" and "+15" refer to the last transaction at least 5 [15] minutes prior to the news event and the 
first transaction at least 5 [15] minutes after the event, respectively. The second line shows 5% critical values 
(one-sided test) from the bootstrap analysis described in the text.    36 




The figure reports averages of the roundtrip transaction costs at different times of the day. The averages are cal-
culated over the 21 trading days in our sample and the 12 DAX stocks. The transaction cost measures are the 
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The figure reports averages of the roundtrip transaction costs at different times of the day. The averages are cal-
culated over the 21 trading days in our sample and the 9 non-DAX stocks. The transaction cost measures are the 
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The figure presents a kernel density plot (Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.05) of the distribution of the trans-
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The figure presents the results of the intraday event study for the DAX stocks and the XLM(100) measure. The 
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The figure presents the results of the intraday event study for the non-DAX stocks and the XLM(100) measure. 
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The figure presents the results of the intraday event study for the DAX stocks and the XLM(100) measure. The 
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The figure presents the results of the intraday event study for the non-DAX stocks and the XLM(100) measure. 
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Executive Summary 
It is universally recognized, both among market practitioners and among researchers, that 
liquidity is the most important aspect of market quality. However, liquidity definitions and 
measurement concepts widely differ. Moreover, the dynamics of liquidity in electronic order 
books are hardly investigated. 
In this paper, we address the analysis of these dynamics by applying a liquidity measure, the 
Exchange Liquidity Measure (XLM), that is measured continuously since 2002 by Deutsche 
Börse AG and that was provided directly by the exchange for the analysis. XLM is based on 
the concept of measuring the round trip costs of a trade of a specific size relative to the cur-
rent midpoint of the spread and thereby considers both spread and depth of the order book. 
Specifically, we investigate the impact of liquidity shocks, i.e. large trades and ticker news, on 
the XLM and its dynamics by applying intraday event study analysis.  The paper is the first 
one to  investigate the impact  of market  endogenous  (large trades) and market  exogenous 
events (ticker news) based on a unified framework. The analysis of the liquidity structure, i.e. 
the static analysis of the liquidity in the Xetra order book, and the analysis of the liquidity 
dynamics is of high relevance for traders that are responsible for order execution in agent and 
proprietary trading as the insights into the ability of the order book to recover and to revert to 
a normal level of liquidity after a shock is a key input for the decisions on order splitting and 
order timing.  
Concerning the structure of liquidity, we find pronounced cross-sectional differences and, as 
expected, liquidity decreases with market cap, trading volume and price level. Although we 
find a distinct u-shaped intraday pattern in liquidity, differences between the depth on the bid 
and the ask side of the order book were not identified which is in contrast to the existing lite-
rature that identifies a deeper order book on the ask side.  
Concerning the dynamics of liquidity after shocks triggered by large trades, we analyze the 
immediate effect and the adjustment path after the shock that consumes significant liquidity   44 
by matching multiple limits in the order book. We find that although liquidity recovers within 
the first minutes of the shock to its normal level, it does not revert to the level that exists im-
mediately before the large trade occurs. This can be explained by an unusually high level of 
liquidity immediately before the large trade and implies that large trades are timed. They are 
executed deliberately when the currently available liquidity is high relative to the average 
level of liquidity in that stock. This result is in contrast to the common view that aggressive 
orders are placed by impatient traders.  
Concerning the dynamics  of liquidity  after shocks  triggered by news (news items  on the 
Bloomberg ticker), we test whether the net effect of (i) the execution of standing limit orders, 
(ii) the cancellation of standing limit orders and (iii) the insertion of new limit orders, i.e. the 
three possible effects after a news item release, is resulting in lower liquidity levels relative to 
the pre-news liquidity. We do not find news items to cause a shock to market liquidity nor 
does liquidity increase after the publication as no clear pattern in the applied liquidity measure 
can be observed. The analysis provides support that the investigated news items do have no or 
only low information content per se and that the analyzed news channel is not the first way 
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